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Audit Quality and Accrual Persistence:
Evidence from the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to examine whether the quality of
accruals, as measured by accrual persistence, improved in the post-SOX period, and second, to
examine the degree to which SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence varies across
companies depending on the degree of their auditor’s independence.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper compares accrual persistence in the pre- and postSOX periods to test the first question. Then, partitioning on relative client importance as a
measure of auditor independence, the paper compares the SOX-based improvement for clients of
low and high independence audit firms.
Findings – The study first demonstrates that accrual persistence increased significantly in the
post-SOX period. The study also finds evidence that in the post-SOX period, the subsample of
companies audited by Big-N auditors with lower-independence experienced the greatest
improvement in accrual persistence.
Originality/value – This is the first paper to evaluate SOX-related improvements in the quality
of earnings as measured by accrual persistence. Prior studies test abnormal accruals and other
earnings management metrics, however, persistence is a more general test of financial statement
quality. This study also is the first to compare SOX-related improvements for clients of firms
with differing levels of independence.
Keywords Sarbanes-Oxley, audit quality, auditor independence, accruals, persistence
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
A series of events occurred in the period after 2001 that potentially had the effect of
improving the quality of reported financial information. Following the “dot-com” bust, a number
of high-profile audit failures (e.g., Enron and WorldCom), the prosecution and subsequent
demise of Arthur Andersen, and the passage of landmark regulatory legislation in the form of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, SOX) created both de facto and de jure changes in the
financial reporting environment. In this study, we address two research questions. First, did the
quality of accruals (measured by accrual persistence) improve in the post-2001 period (hereafter,
the post-SOX period)? Second, if accrual quality improved in the post-SOX period, did this
improvement vary depending on the level of pre-SOX auditor independence?
The first question, dealing with the SOX-era environment, is somewhat controversial
with divided views among the public, corporate management, auditors, and government leaders.
Business leaders have been outspoken in their criticism of SOX, asserting that compliance added
significant costs for minimal benefits. Many have been quick to dismiss SOX as unnecessary and
overly burdensome, even going so far as to deem it “quack corporate governance” (Romano
2005). Concurrent research finds that opportunistic earnings management, proxied using
absolute levels of abnormal accruals, declined in the post-SOX period (Carcello, Hollingsworth,
and Mastrolia 2009; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; and Lobo and Zhou 2006). This behavior was
accompanied in the post-SOX period by a reduced propensity of reported earnings to just meet or
beat analysts' forecasts (Bartov and Cohen 2009), potentially indicating companies are less likely
to engage in opportunistic earnings management. However, Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and
Cohen (2009) find a concurrent increase in the use of real earnings management techniques to
adjust reported financial statement balances after the passage of SOX. They note that these
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techniques are more costly to implement, yet less likely to be considered opportunistic if
detected by investors and auditors. These findings raise the possibility that in the post-SOX
period companies may be merely shifting to less detectable earnings management techniques
rather than reducing earnings management per se.
In this study, unlike the prior published studies, we are interested in SOX-related
improvements in accrual quality in general and not specifically a reduction or shifting in
opportunistic earnings management. We measure relative accrual quality by estimating the
persistence of total accruals. Total accruals include short-term, long-term, and financial accruals,
providing a broader approach than one using just operating accruals, allowing an extension to the
prior literature dominated by abnormal accrual metrics.
Prior accounting research has often used earnings persistence as a proxy for earnings
quality (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002 and Richardson 2003). The conceptual basis for this link
is an argument that higher quality earnings are those that are more sustainable (see Revsine et al.
1999, pp. 224-225 and Bodie et al. 2002, p. 628). Earnings and accrual persistence are a
measure of the degree to which current earnings or accruals are sustained in the future. Schipper
and Vincent (2003) argue that earnings persistence can be an indicator of decision usefulness—
the predominant quality characteristic advocated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Prior research has also linked higher earnings persistence to higher investor response to earnings
information (Kormendi and Lipe 1987). Investors place a higher valuation multiple on earnings
that are expected to persist in the future. In this sense, investors judge more persistent earnings
to be of higher quality.
Measuring accrual quality using persistence also takes a broader view of the sources of
lower quality including both intentional (opportunistic and real) manipulation and unintentional
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measurement error in accruals. This approach allows us to examine the full complement of
decision choices available for management regarding their response to SOX era reforms.
Our second question examines potential differences in the effect of SOX-era reforms on
reporting quality, depending on the level of auditor independence. Recent studies have raised
concerns regarding auditors’ incentives with respect to management’s reporting decisions. The
prior literature, which focused on audit-quality measures that imply auditor competence, may not
provide evidence on the negative effect of impaired independence on financial reporting quality,
even in the presence of auditor ability. The inconsistent evidence (some report reduced, other
report increased, abnormal accruals) from the literature examining the influence of non-audit
service fees on auditor independence is indicative of this (DeFond, Raghunandan, and
Subramanyam 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew
2003; Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang 2005; Francis and Ke 2006). Prior studies have examined
audit quality in the pre-SOX (Lim and Tan 2008) and post-SOX (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) periods separately. To our knowledge we are the first to compare
the effects of SOX depending on the level of auditor independence.1
We construct a sample of audit-client companies over two time periods: 1998 through
2001 comprising the pre-SOX period and 2003 through 2006 comprising the post-SOX period.
This sample is composed of 18,451 company-years audited by Big-N audit firms.2 We first
examine the persistence of accruals in the pre- and post-SOX periods by comparing accrual
persistence in each period, with controls for a variety of non-SOX drivers of accrual persistence.

1

Lobo et al. (2006) find that companies with weaker corporate governance experienced greater improvement due to SOX than
companies with stronger governance.

2

We use the term “Big-N” to represent audit firms generally included in the Big-6, Big-5, and Big-4 during the years of our
sample period. This includes Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, Pricewaterhousecoopers (PriceWaterhouse and Coopers and
Lybrand pre 1998), Deloitte, and KPMG. Prior research (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001) likewise limit their investigation to
only Big-N firms.
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We find that accrual persistence is significantly higher in the post-SOX period. This finding is
consistent with a SOX era-related increase in accrual quality.
We then partition the entire sample of audit-client companies into high- and low-auditorindependence groups based on a measure of audit-firm independence used in prior literature
(e.g., Reynolds and Francis 2001). We compare accrual persistence across this partition. We
then test if the post-SOX improvement in accrual persistence differs between our auditor
independence groups. We expect significantly greater SOX-related improvement in accrual
persistence for low-independence groups, compared to high-independence groups. We base this
expectation on the intended effects of the various SOX-era reforms as well as the general
reporting environment in the post-SOX period. As expected, we find that the post-SOX
improvement is significantly greater for the low independence sub-samples when compared to
the high independence groups.
This study contributes to the SOX and audit-quality literatures in a number of ways. First,
we demonstrate a link between SOX-era reforms and higher accrual persistence for Big-N
audited companies. This is consistent with prior literature that measures accrual quality using
abnormal accruals only.3 Second, we provide evidence that SOX-related improvements in
accrual persistence varies by level of auditor independence. The greatest SOX-related
improvements occur for clients with less independent auditors pre-SOX. This provides some
evidence that an objective that motivated the passage of SOX, improving auditor independence,
was achieved, when measured using our metric for financial statement quality, accrual
persistence.
3

Concurrent research using data from the post-SOX period indicates that improvements in internal controls, potentially
motivated by Section 404 disclosures of material weakness in the system of internal controls over financial reporting (e.g.,
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) and executive certification of financial statements (Carcello et al. 2009), lead to reduced abnormal
accruals. Our research extends this result by contemporaneously examining the pre- and post-SOX periods and a broader
measure of financial statement quality, accrual persistence.
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We note, that like many other empirical studies that investigate the impact of SOX era
reforms (Carcello et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2006) that we cannot
definitively state that the changes we document in financial reporting behavior are solely from
the passage of SOX and the other changes in the auditing environment in that period. Many
other factors (e.g., increased auditor and investor prudence) were in a state of fluctuation during
the post SOX period that might influence decisions affected reported financial statements.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 contains background discussion and
hypothesis development. Section 3 contains the sample selection process and reports descriptive
statistics. Section 4 contains research design and results for tests of the effect of the post-SOX
period on accrual persistence. Section 5 contains research design, results, and sensitivity analyses
for the tests of the effect of audit quality on accrual persistence and tests of whether SOX-related
improvement in persistence depends on audit quality. Section 6 contains concluding comments.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) led to dramatic changes to existing audit and
financial reporting regulations (e.g., Sections 302 and 404), with the intention of improving the
quality of audited financial statements and the quality of auditing services. In addition, the
auditing environment appears to have changed dramatically during the period that SOX was
enacted and implemented (McConnell and Banks 2003; Koehn and Del Vecchio 2004; Ciesielski
and Weirich 2006). A variety of related contemporaneous events such as increased audit fees,
the demise of Arthur Andersen, and greater public scrutiny of auditors and public companies
served to potentially increase the independence of auditors and the quality of reported accruals.
While many question the benefits of SOX (Romano 2005), existing research indicates that SOX
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era reforms have affected managerial decision-making in general (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2005;
Cohen et al. 2008), and more specifically with regard to using abnormal accruals to adjust
financial statement presentation (Carcello et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; and Lobo and Zhou
2006). To extend this research we investigate the influence of the SOX era on financial reporting
quality by examining the persistence of reported accruals, a more complete measure of accrual
quality. Based on prior research, we expect the persistence of accruals to improve in the postSOX period when compared to the period before the implementation of SOX. Stated formally:
H1.

The persistence of accruals will be significantly greater in the post-SOX period
compared to the pre-SOX period.

Note, however, that Cohen et al. (2008) and Bartov and Cohen (2009) find the use of real
earnings management techniques to alter reported financial statement balances increased after
the passage of SOX. This provides an alternative outcome for H1. If real earnings management
activity substitutes for prior use of abnormal accruals to opportunistically adjust financial
statement balances then accrual persistence could decrease or remain unchanged in the post-SOX
period. Unlike prior studies that compare the level of abnormal accruals before and after SOX,
by examining accrual persistence, we are able to account for reductions in financial reporting
quality due to real earnings management activities.
2.2 Audit quality and the effect of SOX
It seems reasonable that relative audit quality will influence the degree to which the
events surrounding and following enactment of SOX affected accrual quality. One would expect
that companies that received high quality audits before the SOX period would see less
improvement in financial reporting quality due to SOX-era reforms than companies with lower
quality audits. This should be particularly true for audit quality issues directly targeted by the
SOX reforms, such as auditor independence.
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A quality audit occurs when a skilled and independent audit firm is able to identify
accounting misstatements and exert pressure on the client to correct those misstatements
(DeAngelo 1981). As a result of reducing accounting misstatements, the audited financial
statements exhibit higher quality. However, as a practical matter, the achievement of this ideal
depends both on the competence of the auditor to find accounting misstatements, and on the
firm’s willingness to exercise its influence over the client to correct misstatements. DeAngelo
(1981) suggests the client-auditor association is a bilateral monopoly that motivates auditors to
compromise their independence in order to retain clients. Therefore, if a particular client
represents a large proportion of an audit firm’s total revenue, the audit firm may be less willing
to exert influence on client reporting choices (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Francis and Yu,
2009). Ghosh, Kallapur, and Moon (2009) find evidence that suggest investors are concerned
about perceived auditor independence, measured as a reduced earnings response coefficient,
using audit fees as a proxy for the level of a client’s importance to the auditing firm.
Based on prior research investigating settings where auditors obtain a significant
proportion of audit revenues from one client, we suggest that auditor independence is potentially
impaired and auditor willingness to correct misstatements is diminished. In this setting, the audit
firm's desire to retain a client that represents a significant economic asset for the firm, leads to
reduced auditor independence (Reynolds & Francis 2001).
In order to indicate auditor independence, we use a measure of the proportion of the total
office-specific audit fees earned from a particular audit client. This measure of client influence
is estimated by the ratio of the client’s audit fees to the total audit fees earned by the audit firm in
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the same office.4 Specifically, a high (low) influence measures indicate potentially impaired
(unimpaired) auditor independence.5
There are several reasons to suggest that client specific influence is related to clientspecific independence and audit reporting decisions. First, for clients that represent a significant
amount of a firm-office’s audit-fee revenue, firms will tend to act in a way that preserves that
revenue. This idea was suggested by the Cohen Commission Report which states "When one or
a few large clients supply a significant portion of the total fees of a public accounting firm, the
firm will have greater difficulty in maintaining its independence." (AICPA, 1978).
Firms with significant revenues from individual clients are likely to have the competence
to identify general and industry-specific misstatements. However, impaired independence due to
the economic pressures of retaining this client may reduce the firm’s willingness to influence the
client to correct the misstatements. The result of uncorrected accounting misstatements would be
audited accruals with lower quality.
As mentioned earlier, many of the provisions of SOX were directed toward improving audit
quality by increasing auditor independence, specifically the ban on non-audit services and the
implementation of a direct communication channel with the audit committee allowing auditors to
bypass management in their discussions of potentially contentious financial reporting and control
issues. In the post-SOX era, the audit committee hires the audit firm, not company management
or the Board of Directors. Therefore, the effect of SOX may be to improve the independence of
audit firms. As previously discussed, the SOX era reforms had dramatic effects on the auditing
marketplace. The provisions of SOX were intended to improve the quality of all audits.
4

Audit fees are often proxied using client size in prior research (Simunic 1980). We adopt this proxy as well because for much of
our sample period audit fee data is not available from Audit Analytics.
5

Note that this does not imply that the competence of the auditor is lacking, just their willingness to adjust financial reports for
misstatements. .
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However, we expect this effect to be greater for audits performed by less independent audit
firms. If SOX encourages all firms to reach the same audit quality level, these firms will have
more room for improvement. We investigate this question by testing whether the SOX-related
improvement is greater for companies with auditors with lower levels of independence. Stated
formally:
H2.

Reported accruals audited by firms with lower levels of independence will have a
greater increase in persistence from the pre-SOX to the post-SOX periods than
those audited by audit firms with higher levels of independence.

3. Data and Sample Selection
We first obtain data from the 2006 and 2007 COMPUSTAT databases over the data years
1997 through 2007. All NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ companies with available industry information
(COMPUSTAT item “DNUM”), audit-firm information (Compustat item 149), and total sales
(item 12) in these data years are included in the calculation of proxies for auditor independence
and audit-firm industry specialization. We limit our sample to Big-N firms to be consistent with
prior literature using similar metrics to determine auditor independence and specialization.
Because actual audit fee data has limited availability for the pre-SOX period, we use the client
company-year’s total sales (natural log) to proxy for audit revenue (Reynolds and Francis 2001).
We calculate the natural log form of total sales by industry, by auditor, by city, by auditor within
industries and by auditor within cities.
We form a dichotomous variable, IND, designed to measure audit-firm independence.
We construct IND by calculating an influence measure used in prior research, first by Reynolds
and Francis (2001). This measure (INFLUENCE), calculated for each client/auditor
combination, is the company’s sales divided by the sum of sales of each publicly-listed company
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audited by an audit firm office.6 We use the natural log of sales in our calculations given its high
correlation with actual audit fees (Craswell et al., 1995; Simunic 1980) which were not publicly
available during some of our sample years. This allows us to determine the economic
importance of a client based on the proportional magnitude of its fees relative to total fees of the
publicly traded companies audited by an individual audit firm office.
Prior studies indicate that actual audit fees paid to (or, in the case of our proxy, the total
client sales audited by) an auditor is a reliable measure for auditor reliance, or economic
dependence, on a client or particular industry (Simunic 1984; Reynolds & Francis 2001; Chung
& Kallapur 2003). We define a high (low) independence audit firm as one that has an
INFLUENCE measure in the lower three (top) quartiles. IND is coded one when INFLUENCE
is in the lower three quartiles indicating unimpaired independence, whereas IND is coded zero
when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, indicating potentially impaired independence.
To control for audit firm specialization, we construct a control variable for industry
specialization (SPEC) as follows. We first calculate the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s
two-digit SIC industry (e.g., Audit Firm A audited 26% of total company sales in two-digit SIC
industry 50 in 1999). Following Palmrose (1986, p 104), we define industry specialists as audit
firms that have a market share of at least 120 percent of an equal division of market share among
the Big N firms existing at that time. Specifically, when the audit firm’s market share is greater
than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1997, 1/5*1.2 (24%) for 1998-2000, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2003-2006,
SPEC is coded one, and zero otherwise. This method has the advantage that it controls for the
consolidation of the Big N firms from six in 1997 to four in 2002. To ensure that the relationship
between audit firm and client-company is well established at the beginning of the fiscal year, we
6
We base our estimate of audit-firm office-specific fee revenue by totaling estimated audit fees earned in a single metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) which should be a good approximation of the service area of an individual audit-firm office.
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assign each company-year the SPEC, metric calculated for that company’s auditor in the prior
fiscal year.7
We then screen sample company-years for required financial statement data in the prior,
current and subsequent years. Earnings is equal to income before extraordinary items
(COMPUSTAT item 18), scaled by average total assets (item 6). Total accruals (TACC) is equal
to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the change in cash and short-term investments (item
1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), minus the changes in total liabilities
(item 181) and preferred stock (item 130), all scaled by average total assets (item 6). Cash flows
(CF) is equal to Earnings, less TACC.
In order to construct an unambiguous test of the relative accrual quality between groups
of companies and between the pre- and post-SOX periods using accrual persistence coefficients,
it will be important to control for other determinants of accrual persistence that may
systematically differ across groups of companies and across time.8 Dechow and Dichev (2002)
discuss a number of company-specific characteristics that are likely to be associated with accrual
persistence, likely to be affected by contemporaneous events, but unrelated to the effect of SOX
or the role of auditors in detecting reporting errors and misstatements. Based on their study, we
define six variables designed to control for company-specific characteristics and
contemporaneous events that may affect accrual persistence. First, company-years with different
operating cycles are more likely to have differing accrual persistence. OPCYCLE is the sample

7

An additional benefit of using lagged audit quality is that is provides some assurance that the direction of causation is from
audit quality to accrual persistence and not the reverse.

8

Since sample company-years experienced both SOX and contemporaneous events simultaneously, and the events affected all
companies in the economy simultaneously, it is not possible to control for a particular contemporaneous event itself, such as the
9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent recession. However, it is possible to control for the effect of those unrelated
contemporaneous events on reported accruals.
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company’s operating cycle, in days. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), OPCYCLE is
calculated as follows:
⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄

(1)

Where AR is accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT item 151), Inv is inventory (item 3), and COGS
is cost of goods sold (item 41). Second, smaller companies are more likely to have lower accrual
persistence compared to larger companies that have more stable and diversified operations. SIZE
is equal to the square root of total assets (this measure of company size is aligned with our proxy
for audit fees). Third, company-years with greater sales volatility are likely to have lower accrual
persistence. SVOL measures volatility in reported sales. SVOL is the standard deviation of sales
(item 12) scaled by average total assets (item 6) over four years. Fourth, and for the same
reasons, company-years with greater cash flow volatility are likely to have lower accrual
persistence. CFVOL measures the volatility of cash flows; it is equal to the standard deviation of
operating cash flows (item 308) scaled by total assets. Finally, company-years reporting losses
are likely experiencing a severe negative shock in their operating environment. Accruals made in
response to these conditions likely involve lower accrual persistence. LOSS is a dummy variable
coded one if Earnings is less than zero and coded zero otherwise. Dechow and Dichev (2002)
find evidence that each of these characteristics, to varying degrees, is associated with accrual
quality.9 In addition to the characteristics suggested by Dechow and Dichev, we expect that a
company’s relative riskiness may affect the persistence of their accruals. Therefore, we will also
control for book-to-market ratio as a general measure of company-specific risk (Fama and
French 1993). BM is equal to book-to-market ratio at fiscal-year-end.
9

Dechow and Dichev (2002) identify three additional variables that affect accrual quality: accrual volatility, earnings volatility,
and accrual magnitude. We do not control for these variables because, unlike the variables we adopt, they measure characteristics
of accruals themselves rather than non-accrual characteristics that might affect accruals persistence. Including these three
variables would inappropriately control for the hypothesized relations; this would amount to “throwing the baby out with the
bathwater.”
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Overall, our data requirements yield a sample of 18,451 company-years, representing
4,439 companies, over the periods 1998 through 2001 and 2003 through 2006. Yearly
subsamples range from 1,516 in 2006 to 2,793 in 1999.10
Table I, panel A contains distributional statistics for the study variables. The mean
(median) company’s earnings represent -1.8 (3.5) percent of total assets, while mean (median)
total accruals equal 4.0 (3.1) percent of assets. Mean Earnings are slightly negative, reflecting
the skewing effects of extreme negative observations. Mean IND of 0.793 indicates that 79.3
percent of sample companies are audited by independent audit firms. In the same way, mean
SPEC of 0.272 indicates that 27.2 percent of the sample companies are audited by industry
specialists. Mean LOSS of 0.300 means that 30.0 percent of the sample companies reported
negative net income.
Table I, panel B contains variable means calculated in the pre- and post-SOX period. CF
and TACC are not significantly different in the pre- and post-SOX periods, while Earnings are
significantly higher in the post-SOX period. IND is significantly higher in the post-SOX period
(0.748 versus 0.855, t = 11.29); however, the economic significance of that difference is
questionable. Each of the mean control variables is significantly different in the post-SOX
period. These significant differences reinforce the importance of controlling for these companyspecific characteristics in our regressions.
Table II contains Pearson and Spearman correlations between the study variables, along
with p-values in parentheses. Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal and Spearman
below. Most of the correlations are statistically significant, but very low. The correlations
between Earnings in period t+1 and both CF and TACC are positive, as expected. This is
10

These sample sizes are calculated after removing observations judged to be excessively influential based on large HAT
variables (greater than 0.007) generated from estimating the two regression models described below. Including some or all of
these outliers causes great instability in estimated coefficients.
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consistent with prior studies that find both CF and TACC reflect positive persistence with respect
to one-year-ahead earnings (e.g., Sloan 1996). Consistent with prior research and with the role of
accruals, the correlation between CF and TACC is significantly negative. As expected, IND and
SPEC are negatively correlated, indicating the importance of controlling for industry
specialization using SPEC. Not surprisingly, LOSS is negatively correlated with one-year-ahead
Earnings, CF, and TACC. LOSS is also negatively correlated with SIZE. Cash flow volatility,
CFVOL, is negatively correlated with CF and positively correlated with LOSS. SIZE is
negatively correlated with both cash flow and sales volatility, which confirms our intuition that
larger firms will have less volatile economic environments.
4. Tests of the effect of SOX on accrual persistence
4.1 Research design
We test H1 by estimating a pooled regression of one-year-ahead Earnings on current CF
and TACC, with separate coefficients estimated pre-SOX and post-SOX for audit clients. We
then compare the pre- and post-SOX accrual persistence coefficients. We expect the persistence
of accruals will be greater in the post-SOX period for both sets of companies.







Earningst 1   0  D pre  1pre CFt   2preTACC t  D post  1post CFt   2post TACCt



 k  2  k 1 Control k  TACC t   
7

(2)

The dummy variable Dpre is equal to one if the year equals 1998 through 2001, and zero
otherwise. Similarly, Dpost is equal to one if the year equals 2003 through 2006, and zero
otherwise. As described in the previous section, accrual persistence can differ between firms due
to economic factors that may systematically differ in the pre- and post-SOX periods. Therefore,
we include six control variables that interact with TACC to control for non-SOX-related
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persistence differences.11 Based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), we would expect the coefficient
on the SIZE interaction to be positive, while the other five control-variable coefficients would be
negative. However, because a number of these control variables are correlated with one another,
these univariate predictions may not hold; therefore, no formal predictions are made about the
direction or magnitude of the control-variable coefficients.





The CF coefficients 1pre and 1post measure the persistence of cash flows with respect





to one-year-ahead Earnings. Similarly, the TACC coefficients  2pre and  2post measure the
persistence of accruals. H1 will be supported if  2post   2pre .
4.2 Results
Table III reports the results from estimating regression (2). The table reports two versions
of this regression; the first set of results excludes the control variables while the second set
includes them. The post-SOX accrual coefficient (  2post ) is significantly greater than the preSOX coefficient (  2pre ) in both the uncontrolled and controlled versions of the regression (tstatistics of 3.78 and 3.44, respectively).12 This finding supports H1; the persistence of accruals
significantly increased in the post-SOX period, compared to the pre-SOX period, after
controlling for other sources of differential persistence.13
11
We do not include a control for SPEC in this regression because its purpose is to control for industry specialization when using
the IND variable which is not used in regression (2). We convert the five continuous control variables to fractional ranks before
interacting them with TACC. Using fractional ranks (that range from zero to one) allow interpretation of the interaction
coefficients as incremental persistence coefficients.
12
The study sample may contain up to 15 company-year observations from a single company. Correlations between these
observations violate independence assumptions of OLS. In addition, the sample is significantly heteroskedastic (χ2 = 406.19, p <
0.0001). Therefore, the t-statistics reported in Table III, and the rest of the study, are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and for
lack of within-company independence in the study sample. These Huber-White t-statistics are calculated based on Diggle et al.
(1994). In untabulated results described in the sensitivity analysis section, we re-estimated our t-statistics simultaneously
controlling for non-independence both within companies and within years (i.e., two-way clustering). All inferences are
unchanged using this more strict control for non-independence.
13

Interestingly, the cash flow coefficient is also significantly greater in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period.
This implies that economic conditions in the post-SOX period caused cash flow persistence to increase. This raises the question
of whether the same economic conditions caused the increase in accruals persistence rather than the hypothesized improvement
in reporting quality. We test the significance of the difference between the improvement in accrual and cash flow persistence for
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We next examine the efficacy of our control variables. In the uncontrolled regression, the
coefficients on TACC are smaller than the CF coefficients. This is consistent with the results in
prior studies, particularly Sloan (1996) and Richardson et al. (2005). This difference reverses
when we add the control variables to the regression. This is not surprising because these
variables are controlling for the economic factors that cause the persistence of accruals to be
lower than that of cash flows. Five of the six control variables have statistically significant
coefficients. Only SIZE has a coefficient in the opposite direction expected.
5. Audit quality, accrual persistence, and the effect of SOX
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table IV reports comparative means across the IND groups. The differences in mean
Earnings, SPEC, LOSS, CFVOL, SVOL, OPCYCLE and SIZE are significantly different for the
two IND groups. The significant differences in the control variable means in each of the panels
demonstrate the importance of controlling for these economic drivers of accrual persistence
when comparing accrual persistence across IND groups.
5.2 Research design
We estimate the following pooled regression to measure the effect of IND on accrual
persistence separately in the pre- and post-SOX periods.





Earnings t 1   0  D pre  1pre CFt   2pre TACC t   3pre INDt 1  TACC t 



D post  1post CFt   2post TACC t   3post INDt 1  TACC t



(3)

 k 1  k  3 Control k  TACC t   
7

the controlled regression. The improvement in accrual persistence is significantly greater than the improvement in cash flow
persistence (0.056, , t-statistic = 2.18). This should not be the case if the improvement in the persistence of each comes from the
same economic cause.
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Regression (3) once again tests for differences in accrual persistence in the pre- and postSOX periods. The addition of interaction variables for auditor independence allows separate
tests for companies audited by high- and low-independence auditors. The coefficients on the
interaction IND × TACC (  3pre and  3post ) measure the incremental accrual persistence for the
high-IND groups, compared to the low groups The coefficients on TACC (  2pre and  2post ) can be
interpreted as accrual persistence for the low-IND group. The difference  2post   2pre measures
the SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence for the companies audited by lowindependence auditors. Similarly, the difference  2pre   3pre    2post   3post  measures the SOXrelated improvement in accrual persistence for companies audited by high-independence
auditors. We can re-test H1 separately for low-independence and high-independence groups by
testing these coefficient differences.
We test H2 by comparing the difference in the improvement in accrual persistence, due to
SOX, between the low- and high-IND groups; we test  2post   2pre   2post   3post    2pre   3pre .
5.3 Results
Table V reports the results of estimating regression (3). We first report the results from
re-testing H1 separately for the low-independence and high-independence groups. H1 is
supported for both groups (0.212 and 0.107, t-statistics = 5.20 and 3.09, respectively). These
results demonstrate the robustness of the H1 test reported for regression (2).
H2 predicts that the SOX-related improvement in accrual persistence will be significantly
greater for the low-IND group compared to the high-IND group. We find significant support for
H2, with the low-IND increase in persistence being 0.105 (t-statistic = 2.43) greater than the
high-IND increase in persistence. These results are consistent with significantly greater SOX-
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related improvement in accrual quality for clients of audit firms classified as low-independence
firms.
Overall, the results from estimating regressions (2) and (3) provide evidence that the
quality of accruals improved in the post-SOX period, but occurs disproportionately in companies
audited by audit firms with potentially impaired independence in the pre-SOX period. These
results are consistent with the intentions stated in SOX of improving the quality of audits and
increasing the quality of financial reporting.
5.4 Sensitivity analyses
We consider a number of additional analyses to further understand the scope of the
results reported above. We first examine whether our results are driven by sample companies
switching between Big-N and non Big-N audit firms. During the period in which SOX was
being implemented, significant market changes were occurring that resulted in a large number of
former Big-N clients moving to non Big-N auditors. We re-estimate both regression (2) and
regression (3) for the subsample of companies that did not switch between Big-N and non Big-N
auditors during the years 1997 through 2007. In no case are the inferences using this restricted
sample different from those reported in Table III and V. Therefore, our main analysis is
supported for this subsample.
We next consider whether the relationship between material weakness disclosures
required under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX and abnormal accruals discussed in prior and
concurrent research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, see additional citations in footnote three)
is the main explanation for our results. To test the degree to which the presence or the
remediation of reported material weaknesses are driving our results, we exclude observations
from companies that reported a material weakness adverse opinion in any year. This results in a
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sample size of 16,397 observations. The inferences from these analyses are the same as in our
main results. Therefore, we conclude that our main results are not primarily driven by the
presence or remediation of material weaknesses identified in post-SOX period.
We next examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternate method of calculating our tstatistics. In our primary analyses we report Huber-White t-statistics that control for correlations
between observations from the same company across years. However, the standard errors on
which our t-statistics are based may be biased downward due to cross-correlations between
observations within the same fiscal year. In order to control for cross correlation within years
and within companies, it is necessary to simultaneously control for clustering on both
dimensions. We examine the effect on our hypothesis tests of potential within-year crosscorrelation by re-estimating each of our hypothesis tests using standard errors that control for
both within-year and within-company correlations.14 H1 and H2 are similar to the reported tests
(H1: t=5.04, H2: t=2.74).
We next re-test H1 by estimating the volatility of residuals produced by estimating
regression (3). We estimate residual volatilities in a manner similar to Dechow and Dichev
(2002). Company-specific standard deviations of residuals were estimated separately in the preand post-SOX period. In untabulated results, mean residual standard deviations were
significantly smaller in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period (t-statistic of
8.20). These results are consistent with H1. We then partition the set of company-specific
standard deviations into those with different audit-firm independence. The reduction in residual

14

The procedure used to produce these standard errors is suggested in Petersen (2009). The SAS code we used was written by
John McInnis and is available at: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/jmcinnis/sas_code.htm
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volatility is approximately the same for the low-independence group compared to the highindependence group. These results are inconsistent with H2.15
We also explored the possibility that the time period we choose is unique and that our
results would change if other years were selected. Our main analysis uses observations from two
sets of four years: 1998 through 2001 and 2003 through 2006. This sample includes one
problematic year, 2001, when the economy felt the effects of 9/11. We repeat our analysis using
1997 through 2000 as our pre-SOX sample. The results using this alternate sample are essentially
identical to those reported in Tables III and V.
It is also possible that our results could occur because of a change in the composition of
total accruals rather than because of our hypothesized relations. For example, in the pre-SOX
period total accruals could be composed of relatively more working-capital accruals and less
long-term accruals while the opposite is true in the post-SOX period. Such a change in relative
composition of total accruals could cause an apparent change in the persistence of total accruals
that is unrelated to SOX. We determine the extent to which this affects our results by reestimating equations (2) and (3) using accruals disaggregated into three components: Working
capital accruals, non-current operating accruals, and financial accruals. Disaggregating accruals
in this way should control for changes in the relative composition of total accruals. We find
support for H1 in all three components. We find support for H2 in two of the three components.
We obviously have no predictions in our study of which components of accruals will be more
affected by audit quality or SOX. However, finding support for our hypotheses for at least one
component provides evidence that differential accrual composition is not driving our results.

15

The measurement of residual volatilities in this method may introduce noise that is driving the lack of support for H2. Due to
the fact that our pre- and post-SOX periods are just 4 years each, and to the effects of 4-way partitioning on IND and Pre- versus
Post, the variances were estimated over as few as two observations for some firms.
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Larger companies (those with market capitalization above $70 Million), were required to
implement the requirements of SOX earlier than smaller companies. Therefore, one would
expect the results of our study to be more strongly observed in the large subsample. Consistent
with that expectation, H1 is strongly supported for the large accelerated filers, but not for the
smaller companies. Interestingly, H2 continues to be supported for both groups, but with
marginal significance—possibly due to the loss of statistical power because of the partitioning of
the sample.
Finally, we re-estimate our main regressions making a variety of changes in the sample or
the design. We re-estimate the regressions after eliminating companies that were ever audited by
Arthur Andersen, excluded the control for SPEC, and included all main effects for the
interactions. In no case were the inferences from our hypothesis tests affected.
6. Conclusion
In this study we answer two research questions. First, did the quality of accruals improve
in the post-SOX period? We find evidence consistent with an improvement in accrual quality in
the post-SOX period. Second, does the extent of post-SOX improvement in accrual quality differ
between clients of auditors with low- and high-independence? We find evidence that companies
audited by auditors classified as having lower-independence experienced the greatest
improvement in accrual quality in the post-SOX period.
These findings represent a significant extension of prior studies examining possible
financial reporting benefits from SOX. Our use of accrual persistence, rather than abnormal
accruals, to test our hypotheses allowed us to demonstrate a net improvement in financial
reporting quality, despite the previous findings that real earnings management increased in the
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post-SOX period. Prior studies were not designed to allow the effect of higher real earnings
management to affect their tests of accrual quality.
Several potential limitations to the study should be kept in mind when considering our
results. First, due to lack of actual audit fee data over both the pre- and post-SOX periods, we use
total sales as a proxy for audit fees. While this and prior studies have demonstrated a high
correlation between audit fees and total sales, it is possible that our proxy measures audit fees
with error. Second, since there has been only a short time period since implementation of SOX,
our post-SOX results may not reflect the long-term effects of the post-SOX environment. Future
studies can evaluate the generalizability of our results when more years of post-SOX data
become available. Finally, the post-SOX period was characterized by a number of changes to
the economy aside from those affecting the audit environment. It is possible that despite the
controls used in our main and supplemental analyses that some other omitted variable is driving
our results. A similar limitation is noted in concurrent and prior research investigating the
influence of SOX era reforms on managements use of abnormal accruals (Carcello et al. 2009;
Cohen et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2006).
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Distributional Statistics
Standard
Variable
Mean Deviation

1st
1st
Percentile Quartile

Median

3rd
99th
Quartile Percentile

-0.018

0.222

-0.894

-0.027

0.035

0.079

0.280

0.040

0.182

-0.491

-0.026

0.031

0.102

0.641

-0.051

0.238

-1.008

-0.074

-0.000

0.044

0.339

INFLUENCEt-1 0.053

0.126

0.001

0.005

0.013

0.039

0.705

INDt-1

0.793

0.405

0

1

1

1

1

SPECt-1

0.272

0.445

0

0

0

1

1

BMt

0.570

9.776

0.015

0.268

0.482

0.806

3.141

LOSSt

0.300

0.458

0

0

0

1

1

CFVOLt

0.084

0.258

0.006

0.027

0.049

0.090

0.578

SVOLt

0.190

0.278

0.008

0.065

0.121

0.226

1.102

155.720

2,924.109

0.000

59.711

99.167

152.136

481.792

31.187

39.732

2.706

9.411

18.045

35.900

193.259

Earningst+1
TACCt
CFt

OPCYCLEt
SIZEt

Panel B: Distributional Statistics Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Pre-SOX
Post-SOX
Mean
Mean
Variable
(1998 – 2001)
(2003 – 2006)
Difference

t-statistic

-0.031

0.001

0.032

4.56

0.036

0.045

0.009

1.44

CF

-0.053

-0.048

0.005

0.74

IND

0.748

0.855

0.107

11.29

SPEC

0.295

0.241

-0.054

-5.39

BM

0.752

0.317

-0.435

-11.17

LOSS

0.321

0.272

-0.049

-4.90

CFVOL

0.094

0.071

-0.023

-3.23

SVOL

0.214

0.157

-0.058

-7.34

176.675

126.676

-49.999

-67.78

26.908

37.117

10.210

109.50

Earningst+1
TACC

OPCYCLE
SIZE
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Notes for Table I
= Average total assets (item 6) over year t.
= Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET.
= Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193),
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130).
CF
= Cash flows; Earnings – TACC
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office.
IND
= Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one
otherwise.
AVASSET
Earnings
TACC

BM
LOSS
CFVOL
SVOL

= Audit firm industry specialization dummy; when the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC
industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2000, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2003-2006
SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise.
= Book-to-market ratio
= Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise.
= Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.
= Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.

OPCYCLE

= Operating cycle in days;

AR
Inv
Sales
COGS
SIZE

=
=
=
=
=

SPEC

Accounts receivable (item 151)
Inventory (item 3)
Sales (item 12)
Cost of goods sold (item 41)
Square root of total assets.

⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄
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Table II
Correlations
Earnings
Earnings

CF

TACC

IND

SPEC

BM

LOSS

CFVOL

SVOL OPCYCLE

0.502
(0.00)

0.132
(0.00)

-0.093
(0.00)

0.033
(0.00)

-0.095
(0.00)

-0.483
(0.00)

-0.198
(0.00)

-0.058
(0.00)

-0.024
(0.00)

0.173
(0.00)

-0.530
(0.00)

-0.103
(0.00)

0.048
(0.00)

0.010
(0.16)

-0.386
(0.00)

-0.187
(0.00)

-0.066
(0.00)

-0.010
(0.08)

0.155
(0.00)

0.025
(0.00)

-0.007
(0.31)

0.016
(0.03)

-0.251
(0.00)

-0.002
(0.76)

0.030
(0.00)

-0.008
(0.28)

0.008
(0.25)

-0.050
(0.00)

-0.006
(0.40)

0.099
(0.00)

0.059
(0.00)

0.045
(0.00)

0.008
(0.28)

-0.280
(0.00)

0.005
(0.25)

-0.058
(0.00)

-0.040
(0.00)

-0.044
(0.00)

-0.008
(0.30)

0.169
(0.00)

-0.007
(0.37)

-0.001
(0.88)

0.003
(0.69)

-0.003
(0.97)

-0.008
(0.27)

0.137
(0.00)

0.065
(0.00)

0.022
(0.00)

-0.208
(0.00)

0.148
(0.00)

0.003
(0.68)

-0.111
(0.00)

0.008
(0.30)

-0.130
(0.00)

CF

0.354
(0.00)

TACC

0.231
(0.00)

-0.527
(0.00)

IND

-0.052
(0.00)

-0.091
(0.00)

0.027
(0.00)

SPEC

0.010
(0.15)

0.040
(0.00)

-0.013
(0.07)

-0.050
(0.00)

BM

-0.229
(0.00)

0.063
(0.00)

-0.179
(0.00)

-0.060
(0.00)

0.062
(0.00)

LOSS

-0.056
(0.00)

-0.355
(0.00)

-0.325
(0.00)

0.099
(0.00)

-0.058
(0.00)

0.007
(0.33)

CFVOL

-0.244
(0.00)

-0.254
(0.00)

-0.004
(0.61)

0.173
(0.00)

-0.123
(0.00)

-0.157
(0.00)

0.341
(0.00)

SVOL

-0.052
(0.00)

-0.103
(0.00)

0.054
(0.00)

0.067
(0.00)

-0.070
(0.00)

-0.012
(0.09)

0.095
(0.00)

0.401
(0.00)

OPCYCLE 0.000
(0.99)

0.012
(0.11)

-0.035
(0.00)

0.048
(0.00)

-0.042
(0.00)

0.044
(0.00)

0.023
(0.00)

0.069
(0.00)

-0.017
(0.02)

0.266
(0.00)

0.232
(0.00)

0.050
(0.00)

-0.295
(0.00)

0.162
(0.00)

-0.023
(0.00)

-0.339
(0.00)

-0.540
(0.00)

-0.280
(0.00)

SIZE

SIZE

-0.011
(0.14)
-0.110
(0.00)
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Notes for Table II
Pearson Correlations are reported above the diagonal and Spearman Correlations below the diagonal. Correlation p-values reported in parentheses.
= Average total assets (item 6) over year t.
= Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET.
= Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the change in cash and short-term investments (item 1),
plus the change in short-term investments (item 193), minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130).
CF
= Cash flows; Earnings – TACC
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office.
IND
= Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one otherwise.
AVASSET
Earnings
TACC

BM
LOSS
CFVOL
SVOL

= Audit firm industry specialization dummy; when the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for 1989-1997,
1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise.
= Book-to-market ratio
= Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise.
= Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.
= Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.

OPCYCLE

= Operating cycle in days;

AR
Inv
Sales
COGS
SIZE

=
=
=
=
=

SPEC

Accounts receivable (item 151)
Inventory (item 3)
Sales (item 12)
Cost of goods sold (item 41)
Square root of total assets.

⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄
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Table III
Regressions of one-year-ahead earnings on current cash flow and accruals, with separate
coefficients for pre- and post-SOX periods







Earningst 1   0  D pre  1pre CFt   2preTACC t  D post  1post CFt   2post TACCt



 k  2  k 1 Control k  TACC t   
7

Variable
Intercept
Pre-Sox:
CF
TACC
Post-Sox:
CF
TACC
Controls
BM*TACC
LOSS*TACC
CFVOL*TACC
SVOL*TACC
OPCYCLE*TACC
SIZE*TACC

(2)

Estimated
Coefficients

t-statistics

Estimated
Coefficients

t-statistics

-0.006

-4.87

-0.006

-5.03

0.757
0.626

34.33
26.71

0.759
0.841

34.24
14.04

0.817
0.753

33.39
30.76

0.817
0.955

33.51
16.50

-0.089
-0.005
-0.100
-0.102
-0.093
-0.087

-1.65
-0.18
-2.21
-1.89
-2.22
-1.79

Adjusted R2

0.47

Hypothesis test:
H1:  2post   2pre

0.127

0.48

3.78***

0.114

3.44***
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Notes for Table III
Huber-White t-statistics calculated as described in Diggle et al. (1994)
***
Significant at greater than 0.01; one-tail test
**
Significant at greater than 0.05; one tail test

CF
Dpre
Dpost

= Average total assets (item 6) over year t.
= Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET.
= Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193),
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130).
= Cash flows; Earnings – TACC
= Dummy variable coded one if year equals 1997 through 2000; zero otherwise.
= Dummy variable coded one if year equals 2003 through 2006; zero otherwise.

BM
LOSS
CFVOL
SVOL

=
=
=
=

OPCYCLE

= Operating cycle in days;

AR
Inv
Sales
COGS
SIZE

=
=
=
=
=

AVASSET
Earnings
TACC

Book-to-market ratio
Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise.
Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.
Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.

Accounts receivable (item 151)
Inventory (item 3)
Sales (item 12)
Cost of goods sold (item 41)
Square root of total assets.

⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄
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Table IV
Variable means partitioned by IND
Variable

IND = 0

IND = 1

Difference

t-statistic

Earningst+1

0.023

-0.028

-0.051

-6.04

TACC

0.031

0.042

0.011

1.44

-0.005

-0.063

-0.058

-6.74

SPEC

0.316

0.261

-0.054

-4.50

BM

0.689

0.539

-0.150

-2.78

LOSS

0.212

0.324

0.112

9.12

CFVOL

0.055

0.092

0.037

4.13

SVOL

0.165

0.196

0.03123

3.24

109.879

167.705

57.825

62.14

52.963

25.493

-27.470

-248.59

CF

OPCYCLE
SIZE

= Average total assets (item 6) over year t.
= Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET.
= Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193),
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130).
CF
= Cash flows; Earnings – TACC
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office.
IND
= Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one
otherwise.
AVASSET
Earnings
TACC

BM
LOSS
CFVOL
SVOL

= When the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for
1989-1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise.
= Book-to-market ratio
= Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise.
= Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.
= Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.

OPCYCLE

= Operating cycle in days;

AR
Inv
Sales
COGS
SIZE

=
=
=
=
=

SPEC

Accounts receivable (item 151)
Inventory (item 3)
Sales (item 12)
Cost of goods sold (item 41)
Square root of total assets.

⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄
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Table V
Regressions of one-year-ahead earnings on current cash flow and accruals, with separate
coefficients for pre- and post-SOX periods and IND
Earnings t 1   0  D pre  1pre CFt   2pre TACC t   3pre INDt 1  TACC t  



D post  1post CFt   2post TACC t   3post INDt 1  TACC t



 k 1  k  3 Control k  TACC t   
7

Variable (hypothesis test)
Intercept
Pre-Sox:
CF
TACC
IND*TACC
Post-Sox:
CF
TACC
IND*TACC
Controls
SPEC*TACC
BM*TACC
LOSS*TACC
CFVOL*TACC
SVOL*TACC
OPCYCLE*TACC
SIZE*TACC
Adjusted R2

Estimated
Coefficients
-0.006

t-statistics
-5.06

0.759
0.845
0.000

34.22
13.95
0.00

0.817
1.057
-0.105

33.47
17.24
-3.17

-0.030
-0.086
-0.006
-0.097
-0.102
-0.093
-0.086

-0.81
-1.57
-0.21
-2.13
-1.90
-2.23
-1.69

0.48

Hypothesis Tests:
H1:
post
pre
Low-IND:  2   2
High-IND:  2post   3post   2pre   3pre



H2:

 



0.212
0.107

 2post   2pre   2post   3post    2pre   3pre  0.105

5.20***
3.09***
2.43**

(3)
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Notes for Table III
Huber-White t-statistics calculated as described in Diggle et al. (1994)
***
Significant at greater than 0.01; one-tail test
**
Significant at greater than 0.05; one tail test
= Average total assets (item 6) over year t.
= Income before extraordinary items (item 18), scaled by AVASSET.
= Total accruals, scaled by AVASSET. Total accruals are equal to the change in total assets (item 6), minus the
change in cash and short-term investments (item 1), plus the change in short-term investments (item 193),
minus the changes in total liabilities (item 181) and preferred stock (item 130).
CF
= Cash flows; Earnings – TACC
= Dummy variable coded one if year equals 1997 through 2000; zero otherwise.
Dpre
= Dummy variable coded one if year equals 2003 through 2006; zero otherwise.
Dpost
INFLUENCE = The ratio of the audit fees earned from this client over the total audit fees earned in the audit-firm office.
IND
= Audit firm independence dummy; equal to zero when INFLUENCE is in the top quartile, and equal to one
otherwise.
AVASSET
Earnings
TACC

BM
LOSS
CFVOL
SVOL

= When the audit firm’s share of the company-year’s two-digit SIC industry is greater than 1/6*1.2 (20%) for
1989-1997, 1/5*1.2 (25%) for 1998-2001, or 1/4*1.2 (30%) for 2002-2005 SPEC is coded one, zero otherwise.
= Book-to-market ratio
= Dummy variable coded one if Earnings is less than zero, coded zero otherwise.
= Cash flow volatility; the standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.
= Sales volatility; the standard deviation of sales, scaled by total assets measured over 4 years.

OPCYCLE

= Operating cycle in days;

AR
Inv
Sales
COGS
SIZE

=
=
=
=
=

SPEC

Accounts receivable (item 151)
Inventory (item 3)
Sales (item 12)
Cost of goods sold (item 41)
Square root of total assets.

⁄
⁄

⁄
⁄

